# Shielded ARM Trust Assumptions And Security Properties **URL:** https://forum.anoma.net/t/shielded-arm-trust-assumptions-and-security-properties/2647 **Category:** RM **Created:** [April 10, 2026, 3:23pm UTC](https://forum.anoma.net/t/shielded-arm-trust-assumptions-and-security-properties/2647 "2026-04-10T15:23:27Z") **Posts on this page:** 1 **Page:** 1
### Author: ![vveiln](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/forum.anoma.net/vveiln/32/60_2.png) [@vveiln](https://forum.anoma.net/u/vveiln) #### Post date: [April 10, 2026, 3:23pm UTC](https://forum.anoma.net/t/shielded-arm-trust-assumptions-and-security-properties/2647/1 "2026-04-10T15:23:27Z")
This post is an attempt to extract ARM trust assumptions and specify the intended security properties. # 1. Actor Trust Model | # | Actor | Trust Assumption | Incentives | Malicious potential (outside trust assumptions) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Users | Act according to economic incentives | Protect own funds | Create invalid or unauthorized transactions | | 2 | Application Developers | Implement required security checks | Adoption, fees, reputation | Embed backdoors in business logic | | 3 | Consensus | Order transactions fairly, include valid transactions | Block rewards, fees, reputation | Censor transactions, reorder for MEV, include invalid transactions | | 4 | Executor | Reject invalid transactions, execute in determined order | Block rewards, fees, reputation | Censor transactions | | 5 | Discovery Server | Not share sensitive information (discovery keys, receiver identities) | Service fees for discovery, reputation | Censor discovery responses | | 6 | Solvers | Act according to economic incentives | Profit from matching intents, fees, reputation | Create invalid transactions, steal resources, front-run users, reveal sensitive information | | 7 | Network Adversaries | — | Financial profit | Modify transactions in transit, inject fake transactions, replay old transactions | ## 2. Other trust assumptions | # | Category | Assumption | | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Cryptographic Primitives | SHA256, Keccak256, AES256-GCM, SHA256-KDF, Pedersen commitment, k256 elliptic curve, ECDSA, RISC Zero STARK/Groth16, PRNG implementations are secure | | 2 | Private key secrecy | Users protect their keys: nullifierKey never published; encryption keys held only by receiver | | 3 | Nonce uniqueness | Nonce is unique for every resource | | 4 | State consistency | Commitment tree and nullifier set consistent across nodes | | 5 | External libraries correctness | All external libraries correctly implement relevant functionalities | ## 3. Security properties | # | Category | Property | Definition | Enforcement | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Asset Security | Resource Uniqueness | Each resource created once | Uniqueness checks in commitment tree and nullifier set | | 2 | Asset Security | Existence Before Consumption | Only created persistent resources can be consumed | Merkle path proof in compliance proof | | 3 | Asset Security | No Double Spend | Consumed resource cannot be consumed again | Global nullifier set membership check | | 4 | Asset Security | Balance Preservation | Total quantity per kind cannot differ from `expectedBalance` | Delta proof against `expectedBalance` | | 5 | Asset Security | No Theft, No Unauthorized creation | Resources cannot be consumed without authorization | Nullifier computation requires nullifierKey; a valid logic proof is required; balance | | 6 | Asset Security | Append-only Log | Commitment tree and nullifier set grow monotonically | Append-only structures | | 7 | Asset Security | Kind Distinctness | Different resource kinds cannot offset each other | DeltaHash is kind-distinct | | 8 | Integrity | Commitment Integrity | Created commitments must match compliance proof instance | Recomputed from witness and compared to instance | | 9 | Integrity | Nullifier Integrity | Consumed nullifiers must match compliance proof instance | Recomputed from witness and compared to instance | | 10 | Integrity | Logic Reference Integrity | Logic reference must match its hash in compliance proofs | Checked in compliance circuit | | 11 | Integrity | Delta Integrity | Compliance unit delta must be correctly computed from resource deltas | Checked in compliance circuit | | 12 | Integrity | Tag Integrity | Resource tags must be recomputed from witness and match instance | Binding between instance and witness | | 13 | Integrity | Action Tree Root Integrity | Action tree root must correctly commit to all tags in the action | Tag inclusion verified against tree root in logic proofs | | 14 | Integrity | Resource Encryption Correctness | Encrypted resources must be correctly decryptable by receiver | Verifiable encryption checked in RL circuits | | 15 | Authorization | Logic Constraint Enforcement | Creation/consumption must satisfy logic | Resource logic proof per resource | | 16 | Authorization | ARM Compliance Enforcement | All state changes must comply with RM rules | Compliance proof per CU | | 17 | Privacy | Transaction Content Privacy | Resource objects not publicly readable | In-band encryption | | 18 | Privacy | Receiver Privacy | Cannot determine receiver from public data | In-band encryption | | 19 | Privacy | Linkability Resistance | Cannot link nullifier to commitment | Separate derivation paths | | 20 | Privacy | Cross-Transaction Privacy | Cannot link resources across transactions | Fresh nonce and seed per resource | | 21 | Privacy | Function Privacy \[1\] | Asset types and logic behavior hidden | Recursion | | 22 | Invariants | Action Scope Isolation | Logic proofs only see resources in their action | Input map; action tree root | | 23 | Invariants | Transaction Atomicity | All actions succeed or fail together | Transaction validity bound to delta proof | | 24 | Invariants | Transaction Composition | Composition of valid transactions is valid | CU and Action union; delta proof aggregation | | 25 | Liveness | Verifiability | Anyone can verify transaction validity | Public proofs; replicated state | * * * 1. Currently not implemented but enabled by design