# Shielded Kudos Pt. 2: Verifying Constraint Authorship

**URL:** <https://forum.anoma.net/t/shielded-kudos-pt-2-verifying-constraint-authorship/1342>\
**Category:** Applications\
**Created:** [March 27, 2025, 9:00am UTC](https://forum.anoma.net/t/shielded-kudos-pt-2-verifying-constraint-authorship/1342 "2025-03-27T09:00:22Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
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**Author:** ![vveiln](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/forum.anoma.net/vveiln/32/60_2.png) [@vveiln](https://forum.anoma.net/u/vveiln)\
**Post date:** [April 1, 2025, 6:46am UTC](https://forum.anoma.net/t/shielded-kudos-pt-2-verifying-constraint-authorship/1342/9 "2025-04-01T06:46:46Z")

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I didn’t put it in the witness in this post because otherwise a malicious prover can reuse any other signature signed by this public key. I couldn’t come up with a way to fix that. Specifically, if we expect the user to sign both receive logic and intent logic, the signatures can be reused. I believe in the function privacy case this won’t leak information, but I agree that exposing the signature is bad. Do you see a way around it?

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